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ABSTRACT
This thesis argues that the chairmen of the defense-related committees in the House
and Senate continue to wield enormous power offer defense legislation.
This thesis is based on a detailed empirical analysis of the fate of amendments
offered to the defense authorization and appropriation bills from 1981-1992. To measure
the power of the chairmen, the thesis assesses how often their positions were sustained on
floor amendments. Data also is analyzed on which members tended to offer amendments,
whether the passage rate was higher for amendments that did not alter defense spending,
and a variety of related issues.
It was found that on 95.53% of amendments offered to defense authorization bill in
the Senate and 95.1% in the House, the full Senate and House voted in accordance with
the preference of the chairmen of their respective Armed Services Committees. An even
higher percentage of victory (96.1) was achieved by the chairmen of the House and Senate
Defense Appropriations Subcommittees. Data analysis shows that when amendments are
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL THESIS
This thesis argues that the Chairmen of the Senate and
House Armed Services Committees, Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga) and
Representative Les Aspin (D-Wi) wield considerable power over
defense budgeting in their respective houses of Congress. The
current political science literature on the subject claims the
opposite: in particular, the chairmen have been losing power
since the mid-1970 's because their legislation has been
amended increasingly often on the House and Senate floor.
Amendment data can provide an important indication of a
chairman's influence. No chairman wants to see his
legislation altered by any amendment he opposes. However,
little empirical work has been done using recent amendment
voting to test the widespread notion that chairmen are losing
power. Thus a detailed empirical analysis of the fate of
amendments to the defense authorization and appropriations
bills from 1981-1992 was conducted. To measure the power of
the chairmen, the thesis assessed how often their positions
were sustained on floor amendments.
Also, the data was analyzed on which members tended to offer
amendments, whether the passage rate was higher for amendments
that did not alter defense spending and a variety of related
issues. Analysis included the total number of amendments
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offered in both the Senate and the House to Defense
Authorization Bills. Evaluated as a block over the whole
period and on a year by year basis, the data was analyzed and
compared who offered the amendment, whether it was offered by
a Republican or a Democrat, and whether it was offered by a
committee member or a non-committee member. Next the thesis
examined and compared the passage rates of Republican versus
Democrat amendments and the passage rates of committee member
versus non-committee member amendments. The last thing that
studied on the Authorization Bills was the chair's position
regarding the amendments that passed, were rejected and the
total of the two added together.
The thesis contends the main reason that the chairmen
still have power is the total percentage of the chair's vote.
The total of the chair's vote is the statistic that proves
that the chairmen still have power. In the Senate, 95.53% of
the time the chairman's vote was the ultimate fate of the
amendment. The total of the chairman's vote in the House was
just slightly lower at 95.1%.
Thus a final conclusion is that the chairmen of the House
and Senate Armed Services Committees and to a lesser extent
the chairmen of the Subcommittees on Defense Appropriations
still wield a considerable amount of power in the defense
budgeting process. This is important for several reasons.
First, members in both the House and the Senate should realize
this so if they want to get their amendment passed they need
vii
to have the support of the chairman. More importantly the
Secretary of Defense and the leaders of the four services
should understand that when they want something that is very
important to them regarding the defense budget, they will
primarily have to sell their desires to the chairman and the
ranking minority member of the defense committees. They do
not have to talk to each and every Senator or Congressman.
VI 11
I. Introduction
This thesis argues that the Chairmen of the Senate and
House Armed Services Committees, Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga) and
Representative Les Aspin (D-Wi) wield considerable power over
defense budgeting in their respective house of Congress. This
thesis conflicts with the conventional wisdom in the recent
literature on Congress, which argues that after the Vietnam
War, the power of committee chairman declined sharply and was
defused among more Senators and Representatives. To examine
how powerful the chairman are in controlling defenses spending
legislation, this thesis conducts an empirical analysis of
House and Senate voting on amendments offered to defense
authorization legislation during 1981-1992.
The Committee Chairmen who have dealt with the defense
budget in both the Senate and the House of Representatives
have always played an important role when it comes to shaping
our country's defense and our defense policy. Each and every
chairman has run his committee his own way. However historic
activity within the Senate and House Armed Services Committees
can be divided into two eras
.
The first era covers the initial 180 years or so of
interaction between Congress and the military. During this
era the chairman was usually the most informed committeeman
and the person the rest of the committee turned to for help.
The committees relied on the different branches of the
military to provide assistance to the committee to aid them
when they were faced with a difficult decision. Basically,
though, the man who sat in the committee chairman's seat was
the most powerful member of his respective branch of Congress.
Other members of Congress did not worry too much about the
military unless their district had a military base or a
military contractor. The chairman was able to dictate how his
respective house voted on defense issues.
The second era emerged at the end of the Vietnam War and
after the Watergate scandal. Members of Congress became
disillusioned with the way the White House was running the
war. They increasingly became more interested in defense
issues. This interest increased after Watergate with the
election of a new and large freshman class of Representatives
and Senators who came in with a new idea on how to run things.
They looked to make Congress more influential regarding
defense matters. This new group broke some old traditions and
this led to the new era. James M. Lindsay, Congress and
Nuclear Weapons , and Barry M. Blechman, The Politics of
National Security: Congress and U.S. Defense Policy call this
era one of power diffusion. They contend that over the last
20 years, power in Congress has been spread out among its
members at the expense of committee chairman. They feel that
this is especially true with regard to the defense budget.
I disagree with both Mr. Lindsay and Mr. Blechman. I
believe that today's chairmen, Senator Nunn(D-Ga) and
Representative Aspin(D-Wi), both have considerable power and
have continued to influence the activity of their respective
houses on defense issues. To prove this an empirical analysis
of their votes on the amendments that are offered to the bills
was conducted. It goes through the last 12 years of
Authorization Bills in the House and the last 11 years in the
Senate and determines how the committee chair voted and
compares that with whether the measure was passed or defeated.
Similarly, the thesis also examines the last 11 years of
Appropriations bills in the House and Senate. This analysis
illustrates that if the chair was in favor of the measure it
passed and if he was against it, the measure was either
defeated, tabled or withdrawn. In the end, this analysis
still proves that the committee chairs do have a lot of power
when it comes to the defense budget and defense issues.
II. History and Membership of the Defense Committee
The history of the defense committees in Congress is
quite intriguing. The defense committees have played an
important role in defense matters over the years. The history
of the defense committees can be divided up into two different
and distinct eras. Each of the eras has a history all of its
own. The dividing point between the two eras is the end of
United States involvement in the Vietnam War and Watergate.
During the first era which lasted until 1970, the
committees were ruled by strong chairmen who were hawkish on
defense matters. Furthermore, the committees themselves were
made up of members who themselves were hawks. On most of the
important and substantive issues, the defense committees and
their chairmen almost always deferred to military expertise. 1
The common belief shared among most of the legislators was
best stated by that of long time House Armed Services
Committee Chairman Carl Vinson (D-Ga) that "military men
should make military decisions." 2 This belief is a great
example of how the defense committees did business in the
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. James M. Lindsay, Congress And Nuclear Weapons ,




first era, they trusted the Defense Department and had a good
working relationship with the Department of Defense.
Another characteristic of this era is the length of
the chairman's reign. An example is Rep. Vinson, who was
Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee for nearly
three decades
.
The functioning of Congressional Committee activity
regarding defense policy started to change in the late 60 's
and early 70 's, when large numbers of younger and more liberal
members were elected to Congress based on their anti-war
positions. Unfortunately, these new members did not have the
same trust in the Department of Defense, hence the trust of
Congress as a whole started to ebb. The Congress and
especially the doves of the House and Senate, who were given
a public mandate to change the manner in which Congress
affected defense policy, were not that fond of the military
and, were now given a good reason to change things. They were
not pleased with the way the war was being run by both the
Department of Defense and Presidents Johnson and Nixon. They
wanted to change the old policies, so they set out to reform
bureaucratic activity within Congress.
The first of these reforms came in 1970 with the passage
of the Legislative Reorganization Act which was sponsored by
the new members of Congress. 3 This act revamped and
reorganized the committees and the committee process. Junior
committee members gained more power and the committees were
decentralized. This movement toward decentralization is
illustrate by James Lindsay contention that
The dispersion of committee power combined with rising
floor pressure to push the committees into more active
oversight, [ sic 1 Although the defense committees did not
become ant imilitary , the automatic deference to military
expertise that Vinson and his colleagues knew so will
disappeared. 4
The committees and Congress started to do what they thought
was right for the military and the country and stopped using
the military as their only source of advice on these matters.
The reforms continued when in 1973 the new members
forced the House Democratic Caucus to adopt a Subcommittee
Bill of Rights. According to Barry Blechman who in his book
states
The new Subcommittee Bill of Rights and the previous
reforms greatly limited the power of committee
Chairpersons. Also the reforms gave greater authority and
resources to subcommittees, ensured more choice
3
. Barry M. Blechman, The Politics of National
Security: Congress and U.S. Defense Policy , (New York and




assignments for junior members and opened up committee
hearings and votes. 5
These reforms took root in Congress in the 1970' s. A
good example of how the reforms affected the committee process
is the fate of former House Armed Services Chairman F. Edward
Herbert (D-La). Representative Herbert (D-La) , who became
chairman in 1970, resisted the changes and it cost him the
chairmanship in 1975 to Melvin Price (D-Il). Representative
Price (D-Il) and his counterpart in the Senate, Senator John C.
Stennis (D-Miss) embraced the reforms and adopted them. They
both incorporated these reforms int their respective
committees and ran their committees accordingly.
Blechman, 33
Ill .Methodology
In the previous chapter, I contended that the chairmen of
the defense committees in both the House and the Senate
maintained the power of their predecessors of the first era.
I also stated that the chairmen retained this power despite of
the congressional reforms in the 1970' s. I intend to prove
this by conducting a detailed empirical analysis on the fate
of amendments offered to the defense bills in both the Senate
and House, and how the chairman voted on each amendment. I
will look at the Defense Authorization Bills of the House of
Representatives from 1981 through 1992 and the Defense
Authorization Bills of the Senate from 1981 through 1991.
I found the bills by first looking them up in the Daily
Digest issue of The Congressional Record . Once I obtained the
bill's number, an example of which is the Defense
Authorization for the Senate in 1981 was numbered S815, then
I would look it up in the appropriate year of The
Congressional Record Index . In the index, I would find out
what day the bill was presented by the chairman to its
respective body. I would also find out what pages the bill
was debated on and what pages of the record I could find the
amendments that were offered to the bill. Then I would look
the bill up in The Congressional Record , and get started
looking up the amendments.
Once I found each and every amendment, I would look for
several things. First I would see who offered the amendment
and note the Senator or Congressman's name. Next I would then
note the subject matter of the amendment. I wanted to
determine whether or not the amendment dealt with money, or if
it dealt with a non-monetary subject. Sometimes it was not
that easy to determine the subject of the amendment. In the
section of The Congressional Record dealing with the Senate
it was easier to determine the amendment's subject because the
purpose of the amendment was usually given in a paragraph
along with the amendment. Otherwise I would have to read the
amendment to determine its subject manner, as I had to do with
every amendment offered in the House. Usually I could
determine the amendments purpose but sometimes it was hard to
decipher what the amendment dealt with because of the way it
was worded. I often suspected that the authors of the
amendments did this on purpose so a layman might not fully
understand their amendment. With these amendments, I would
read the explanation of the amendment given by the author when
it was debated on the floor to find out the purpose of the
amendment. The next thing I would do would be to find out the
fate of the amendment. I would see if the amendment was
accepted or defeated and how it was accepted or defeated. I
would also record the vote if one was taken to determine its
fate. The last thing that I did was determine and record the
chairman's position on the amendment.
I did this procedure for each amendment offered for the
years 1981 through 1992 in the House and Senate. After I
finished and obtained all of my data, I then coded it several
ways. First I determined if the amendment dealt with money of
not. This is important because the non-money amendments might
pass at a higher rate than the money amendments because the
chairman will be tougher on amendments that change the
financial aspects of his bill. Second, I determined whether
or not the amendment was offered by a committee member or a
non-committee member. I did this because I wanted to see if
committee member amendments passed at a higher rate and also
determine if they were supported at a higher rate by the
chairman. Third, I determined whether the amendment was
offered by a Republican or a Democrat. Fourth, I determined
if the amendment had been modified before it was accepted or
rejected. The last thing I coded was the amendment's
disposition ( ie . its fate). This was not as easy to code as
the other four variables
.
The fate of an amendment results in it either being
accepted or rejected. However, there is more than just one
way to accept an amendment and more than just one way to
reject an amendment. In fact there are a total of eleven ways
to either accept or reject an amendment. One way is that the
amendment was accepted without a vote. In my analysis, during
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the debate on the amendment if both parities said that they
approved of the amendment it was accepted. Since there was no
formal vote on these amendments, I coded the chairman's
position as in favor of the amendment because most of the time
he was the one who said that the amendment was accepted by his
party (and because he could have blocked acceptance if had
wished) . The second type of outcome is when an amendment is
rejected by a voice vote. It is significant to note in my
analysis that the chairman was always against the amendment.
The third outcome is when an amendment is accepted by a roll
call vote. The fourth outcome is when an amendment is
defeated by a roll call vote. The fifth outcome is when an
amendment that is tabled by a roll call vote. The sixth
outcome is when an amendment is ordered on the table. This
only happens on the Senate. Furthermore, these amendments do
not even make it to the floor of the Senate. These amendments
are coded with respect to the chair's position as the chairman
being against the amendment unless the chairman offered the
amendment. The seventh outcome is when an amendment is
withdrawn by the author who offered it before it can be voted
on. The eighth is when an amendment that is accepted after a
motion to table it by a roll call vote is defeated. This is
very significant because it shows that the amendment has a lot
of support even though someone wants to defeat it by tabling
it. The ninth outcome is when an amendment that is rejected
on a point of order without a vote. Usually this is an
11
amendment that has no business being offered to a defense
bill(ie. an amendment that might deal with the school lunch
program)
.
The tenth outcome is an amendment that is rejected
on a point of order with a roll call vote sustaining the
parliamentarian's ruling. The final outcome is when an
amendment is tabled after defeat of a point of order ruling by
a roll call vote.
Once I had all the data coded, I entered it into the
computer. Then I ran the statistic program on it and analyzed
the data, the findings of which will be discussed in the next
chapter. In the end, I analyzed the relationship of several
significant variables. The first idea that I looked at was
the chairman's position on the amendments and the amendments
fate. I did this year by year for both the House and the
Senate. From this I was able to see how many of the
amendments the chairman supported compared to the number that
actually passed. I was also able to see how many amendments
the chair voted against and how many were actually rejected.
Second, I analyzed the chair's position on Republican and
Democrat offered amendments and the fate of these amendments.
Next I analyzed at the chair's position on committee member
amendments versus non-committee member amendments. The last
thing I analyzed was the chair's position on money versus non-
money amendments, modified versus non-modified amendments and
their respective fates.
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When I was finished analyzing the data, I took the data
and recoded it into a new table by year. This table has
twenty two columns which cover the chair's voting percentages
on the above mentioned amendments. It also contains the
passage rate percentages of those amendments. The last three
columns are the number of Republican amendments offered,





In this chapter I will report the results of the empirical
analysis that was done on the data that was obtained from The
Congressional Record . I will analyze the total number of
amendments offered in both the Senate and the House to Defense
Authorization Bills. I will analyze them as a block over the
whole period and on a year by year basis. I will also analyze
and compare who offers the amendment, whether it was offered
by a Republican or a Democrat, and whether it was offered by
a committee member or a non-committee member. Next I will
analyze and compare the passage rates of Republican versus
Democrat amendments and the passage rates of committee member
versus non-committee member amendments. The last thing that
I will analyze on the Authorization Bills is the chair's
position regarding the amendments that passed, were rejected
and the total of the two added together. The last section
will be a brief look at the Appropriation Bills from 1981-
1991.
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B. The Results of the Empirical Analysis on Authorization
Bills
1. Total Number of Amendments Offered
a. Senate
Senators offered 1,234 amendments to the Defense
Authorization Bills over the period of 1981 through 1991 (Table
1) . It should be noted that the period from 1981 through 1986
the Senate Armed Services Committee was controlled by the
Republicans. The Democrats controlled the committee since
1987. The Senate Armed Services Committee has had three
chairman over this eleven year period. The first chairman was
Senator John Tower of Texas. He was chairman from 1981
through 1984. He was followed by Senator Barry Goldwater of
Arizona who was the chairman for only two years. The next
chairman is also the current chairman, Senator Sam Nunn of
Georgia, who became the chairman in 1987 when the Democrats
regained the majority in the Senate.
The total number of amendments fluctuated during
the eleven year period from a low total of 21 amendments in
1981 to a high of 234 amendments offered in 1986. The total
number of amendments rose each year during Senator Tower's
tenure as chairman. As mentioned above, in Senator Tower's
first year there were a total of 21 amendments offered. The
total number increased in 1982 and again in 1983.
15
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In 1984, Senator Tower's final year as chairman the total rose
to 118 amendments. The number of amendments that were offered
from 1981 through 1984 increased at a rate of 32.33 per year.
This trend stopped in 1985, Senator Goldwater's first year as
chairman. In 1985 the total number of amendments offered
dropped to 114. But this decline did not last long, in 1986
there were 234 amendments offered. However, 1986 was an
aberration because of the 234 amendments offered, 153 were
ordered on the table. Only 81 of the amendments that were
offered were debated on the floor of the Senate where their
fate was decided.
In 1987, the first year of Senator Sam Nunn's(D-Ga)
tenure as Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the total
number of amendments came back down to a more normal number of
116. The total number of amendments dropped again in 1988 to
91. But in 1989, the number of amendments offered jumped up
to 224. Like 1986, 1989 had a large number, 146, of
amendments that were ordered on the table. The number of
amendments dropped to 107 in 1990 and 79 in 1991.
b. House
The house offered 1021 amendments to their versions
of the Defense Authorization Bills over the period of 1981
through 1992 (Table 2) . The Democrats controlled the House and
the Armed Services Committee for the whole period.
17
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However, the Armed Services Committee had two chairman during
this span . The first chairman was Rep. Melvin Price of
Illinois. His tenure as chairman ended in 1984, when Rep. Les
Aspin of Wisconsin was elected as the new chairman at the
beginning of the 99th Congress in 1985. The changeover was
not done peacefully because Mr. Price was forced out by the
liberal wing of the Democratic Party.
The total number of amendments offered per year in
the House did not fluctuate as much as it did in the Senate,
especially when the 12 year period is broken down into three
four year segments. During the first segment, 1981-1984, the
total number of amendments ranged from a low of 48 to a high
of 74. At the start of the second segment, 1985-1988, there
was a large jump in the number of amendments offered to 157,
an increase of 92 amendments from the previous year. But when
looking at the four year segment alone, there was not a large
fluctuation in the number of amendments offered. The
difference between the high and low of this period was only 32
amendments. Even though the total number of amendments was
much higher during this period, there was not a big jump from
year to year. The third segment, 1989-1992, was not much
different than the first two segments. There was a big drop
in amendments from 128 in 1988 to 69 in 1989. The following
years leveled out and remained somewhat consistent. The jump
in the total number of amendments during the second segment is
directly correlated to there being a new chairman in power.
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The two parties decided to see what they could get away with
a new chairman. The last segment shows that once Rep. Aspin
solidified his power the total number of amendments dropped
and he controlled the proceedings. This is amplified by the
fact that in 1992, 64 of the 78 amendments offered were
offered en bloc by Mr. Aspin.
2. Who Offered the Amendments
a. Republicans or Democrat a
(1) Senate
The 1,234 amendments that were offered in
the Senate over this eleven year period were split evenly
between the Republicans and the Democrats (Table 3) . The
Republicans offered 601 amendments while the Democrats offered
633 amendments. To further analyze this it is important to
break the eleven year period into two smaller periods. The
first period is 1981 through 1986 when the republicans
controlled the Senate. The second period is from 1987 through
1991 when the Democrats controlled the Senate.
During the first period Republicans offered
306 amendments while the Democrats offered 311 amendments.
The number of amendments were split evenly. To emphasize this
point further, in 1981, 1983 and 1984 the Republicans offered
more amendments during those years. While in 1982, 1985 and
1986 the Democrats offered more amendments. The even split
was a mild surprise.
20
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I expected the Republicans to offer a lot more amendments
than the Democrats because they were in control for the first
time in a long while and the Republicans were a very close and
cohesive party. There was no distinct pattern for which party
offered the most amendments.
This changed only slightly when the
Democrats controlled the Senate. Democrats offered 322
amendments to the Republicans 295 amendments. The
differential between the number of amendments offered by the
parties went from a plus five to a plus 27. In the first year
of the second period both parties offered fifty eight
amendments, and during the second year the Republicans offered
three more amendments than the Democrats. The tide changed in
1989 and the Democrats offered more amendments than the
Republicans in the last three year of the period.
(2) House
The Democrats offered four amendments to
every one amendment offered by Republicans. Over the 12 year
span, the Democrats offered 808 amendments or and average of
67.33 a year and the Republicans offered 213 amendments or an
average of 17.7 5 a year (Table 4) . Even though the House was
controlled by the Democrats during this whole period it is
important to divide the period up into two distinct periods.
The first period is 1981 through 1984 when Rep. Price(D-Il)
was the chairman.
22
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During this period Democrats offered 189 amendments, while
Republicans offered 58 amendments. The Democrats offered on
the average 20 less amendments per year during this four year
span than they did over the whole twelve year period. The
Republican average was down slightly to 14.5 amendments a
year
.
With a new chairman in 1985, The number of
amendments offered by Democrats increased. Democrats offered
619 amendments over the last eight years, which averages out
roughly to 77 amendments a year. While Republicans offered
only 155 amendments or an average of 19 per year. But this
period itself needs to be broken into two segments. The first
segment is from 1985 through 1988. During this segment alone
the Democrats offered 428 of their total 808 amendments and
the Republicans offered 115 of their total 213 amendments.
Both parties took advantage of a new chairman and offered a
higher average of amendments than before. The Democrats
offered an average of 107 amendments per year with a high of
116 in 1985, compared to an average of 47 amendments a year
under the last four years of Chairman Price's tenure. The
Republican's average per year rose to 29 a year under the
first four years of Mr. Aspin's tenure. Chairman Aspin
strengthened his control starting in 1989, hence the number of
amendments being offered decreased dramatically. The
Democrats offered an average of 47.7 5 amendments per year,
while the Republican average was only 10 per year.
24
b. Committee Member or Non-Committee Member
(1) House
As mentioned earlier it is important whether
or not the amendments were offered by a committee member or a
non-committee member. The Armed Services Committee in the
House is much larger than its Senate counterpart, but its
percentage of the total House was smaller than the total
percentage of the Senate. The Armed Services Committee of
the 97th Congress consisted of 45 members. The committee grew
in both the 98th and 99th sessions of Congress when one new
member was added in each session. The committee grew to 51
members in the 100th Congress and stayed that way for the
101st Congress. It grew again in 1991 with the 102nd
Congress, to a size of 54. The Democrats had a majority of at
least seven more members on the committee than did the
Republicans
.
The House Armed Services Committee members
offered 623 of the total 1021 amendments over the twelve year
period. 61% of the amendments were offered by 11% of the
House of Representatives. This percentage is slightly skewed
because in a couple of the years the chairman offered several
amendments en bloc and it padded the statistics. But this is
still important because these amendments had to go through the
chairman to reach the floor and to be accepted. It also shows
25
that the committee and the chairman were in control of the
Defense Authorization Bills.
(2) Senate
The Senate Armed Services Committee consists
of Senators from both parties, but with the majority party
having more members on the committee. The Armed Services
Committee in the 97th Congress consisted of 17 Senators. The
size of the committee grew in the 98th Congress to 18 and the
to 19 in the 99th Congress. Today the Armed Services has 20
members and it has remained at this size since 1987.
Armed Services Committee members offered 10 of the 21 total
amendments that were offered. In otherwords, seventeen percent
of the Senate offered 47.6% of the Amendments. This basic
trend continued through out the eleven year period. Armed
Services Committee members offered 525 of the 1234 total
amendments offered, or 42.55% of the amendments. This is
significant because only 19% of the Senate offered 42% of the
amendments while 81% of the Senate offered the remaining 58%.
The Armed Services Committee showed over this period how much
power it had and it exercised it over this period.
3. Passage Rates
The passage rates of committee amendments versus non-
committee member and the passage rates of Democrat versus
Republican offered amendments are also very important. In the
case of Democrat versus Republican amendments you might see a
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higher passage rate for the party that is in control of the
Senate or House. With committee member and non-committee
member amendments you might see how the amendments offered by
committee members pass at a higher rate, because the committee
members have a greater knowledge of defense policy and its
relationship to U.S. national interest.
a. Republican vs. Democrat
(1) Senate
Republican offered Amendments in the Senate
passed at a rate of 58.9% over the eleven year period, while
the amendments offered by democrats passed at a rate of
53.55%. As mentioned earlier the first six years of this
period the Senate was controlled by the Republicans. During
this six year span, Republican amendments passed at a rate
that was 15 percentage points higher than Democrat amendments.
This large difference in passage rates demonstrates that
amendments offered by members of the party in control do pass
at a higher rate. The differential between Democrat and
Republican offered amendment's passage rates was reduced
during the five years of Democrat control that was looked at
to only three percentage points in favor of the Democrats.
During this period 68.12% of the Democrat amendments passed
compared to 65.17% passage of amendments offered by the
Republicans. When comparing the passing rates of the two
periods, the Republicans seem to have more party unity which
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leads to their higher passage rates and the low passage rates




In the House over the twelve year period
(1981-1992), amendments offered by Democrats passed at a rate
of 77.85% compared to the 62.44% rate that the Republican
amendments passed at. First glance at these numbers might
lead one to believe again that the amendments offered by the
party in control passed at a higher rate. But the numbers
alone do not tell the whole story. Republican amendments
actually passed at a higher rate, 70.69%, than Democrat
amendments, 58.73%, during 1981 and 1982. Things changed
during Mr. Price's last two years, 1983 and 1984, as Chairman
of the Armed Services Committee. The passage rates changed
dramatically, and amendments offered by Democrats passed at a
higher rate than Republican amendments. Rep. Price (D-Il) was
being pressured by the liberals within the party to vote more
their way or he would lose his chairmanship. This did occur
in 1985 as we know when Rep. Les Aspin(D-Wi) was selected as
Chairman of the Armed Services Committee even though he was
not the next senior member of the committee. During this
eight year span Democrat offered amendments passed at a 83.68%
clip, while Republican offered amendments passed at a rate of
59.35%. During this span the highest rate of passage of
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Democrat offered amendments was 89.47% in 1990, while the
lowest rate was 73.77% was in 1989. Ironically the lowest
Republican passage rate was also in the same year as the
Democrat's highest rate. The lowest rate was a paltry 9.09%,
but the highest rate was 100% in 1992.
b. Committee Member vs. Non-Committee Member
(1) Senate
Amendments offered by Armed Services
Committee members passed at an average of 58.67% in the Senate
from 1981 through 1991. While the amendments offered by non-
committee members passed at an average of 52.75% over the same
period. Committee member amendments passed at a rate of
54.55% while the Republicans were in control and they passed
at a rate of 62.19% while the Democrats were in control. Non-
committee member amendments also passed at a lower rate,
48.8%, under the Republicans, while they passed at a rate of
57.19% under the Democrats. Comparing the passage rates
between the six years of Republican and five years of Democrat
control of the Senate shows that there was not a big
difference when it comes to the passage rates of committee
member offered amendments and non-committee amendments. This
is a significant fact because overall there is only a six
percentage point difference between the two types of
amendments. This shows that there is a lot of mutual respect
in the Senate for all members and their respective amendments.
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(2) House
In the House both committee member and non-
committee member amendments passed at a higher rate than in
the Senate. Committee member amendments passed at a rate of
80.09% over this twelve year period. While non-committee
member amendments passed at a rate of 66.83%. This is
significant because the differential between the two types of
amendments was 14 percentage points while it was only six in
the Senate. It seems that the amendments offered by committee
members in the House were taken much more seriously than non-
committee member amendments. In addition as mentioned earlier
committee members, which are only 11% of the House, offered
61.02% of the amendments, it is important to know that 499
committee member amendments passed which is 100 more than the
total number offered by non-committee members.
4. Chairman's Position
The last statistic that will be discussed is the most
important statistic. This statistic is the final piece of the
puzzle that proves that the chairmen of the Senate and House
Armed Services Committees does have power. The statistic that
I am talking about is the chairman's position on the
amendments that passed and the amendments that were rejected.




In the Senate, 692 of the 1,234 amendments that
were offered from 1981 through 1991 passed. Of the 692
amendments that passed, the chairman voted for 668 of those
amendments. That equates out to a rate of 96.53% of those
amendments that the chairman wanted to pass did pass. When
looking at the amendments that were rejected, you find that
the chairman voted for the rejection of 513 of the 541
amendments that were eventually rejected. This equates to a
rate of 94.82% of those amendments that the chairman wanted
rejected. When adding the two together to get the total
percentage of the chair's vote in the Senate which is
95.53%(Table 5). So 95.53% of the time the chairman's




The chairman voted for the passage of 96.97% of the
amendments that passed. Again you see that if you want an
amendment to pass, you will need the support of the chairman.
However, the percentage of the chairman's vote for rejection
is much lower in the House than in the Senate. Only 89.69% of
the Amendments that the chairman did not want were defeated.
But when combining the two again, 95.1% of the time the
chairman's position on the amendment was the ultimate fate of
the amendment (Table 6).
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5. The Results of the Empirical Analysis on
Appropriations Bills
I also looked at the Defense Appropriation Bills in
both the House and the Senate from 1981 through 1991. But I
will treat it a little bit differently because there were only
a combined total of 380 amendments offered in both the House
and the Senate over the eleven year period. So I will treat
the Appropriation Bills from both the House and the Senate as
one total entity. During some of those years, there was no
debate on a Defense Appropriation Bill in the Senate because
they did not get to it done in time, so instead a continuing
Appropriation Bill was debated on where they debated on
appropriations for many government departments. With these
bills I would find the amendments that dealt with the military
and record them.
As mentioned above there were 380 amendments offered
over the eleven year period. Three hundred and two of those
amendments were offered in the Senate. While there were only
7 8 amendments offered in House over the same period. The
total number of amendments combined stayed pretty steady on a
year by year basis. The largest total of amendments offered
for a given year was 73 in 1981 and the smallest total was
nine in 1986. In the Senate the largest number of amendments
offered for a given year was 54 in 1991 and the lowest total
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was nine in 1986. In the House the largest total of
amendments offered in the House for a given year was 28 in
1981 and zero amendments in 1984, 1986 and 1987. In the three
years that there were no amendments offered in the House, the
Defense Appropriation Bills were voted on and accepted as
there were written by the Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Defense Appropriations.
In the Senate, Republicans offered 126 amendments and
the Democrats offered 176 amendments over the eleven year
period. This is similar to split in amendments offered to the
Defense Authorization Bills. The split in the House is also
similar to the split found in amendments offered to the
Defense Authorization Bills. Democrats offered 62 of the
total 78 amendments offered in the House, while Republicans
offered on 16 amendments over the eleven period.
As I did for the Defense Authorization Bills, I looked
at the chairman's position on the amendment and compared that
to the amendment's fate. 286 of the total 380 passed in the
House and the Senate. The chairmen in the House and Senate
voted for 272 of the 286 amendments that passed. That equates
to a rate of 95.1% of the amendments that passed the chair
voted for its passage. There were 92 amendments that were
rejected. The chairmen voted for the rejection of 82 of the
92 that were rejected. So 89.13% of the amendments the chair
wanted defeated were defeated. When adding the two together,
93.16% of the time the chair's position on the amendment was
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the ultimate fate of the amendment. In the end, it is quite
apparent that the Chairmen of the Subcommittees on Defense
Appropriations in both the House and Senate have power similar
to that of the Chairmen of the Armed Services Committees in
the House and Senate.
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V. Conclusions
When I started out to work on this thesis, I wanted to
prove that the chairmen of the defense committees still wield
decisive power over the defense budgeting process. I believe
I have easily accomplished that goal. But I also found out a
lot of other interesting things that take place in the House
and the Senate when it comes to the defense budget process.
Namely, I found out that there are a lot of differences
between the House and the Senate when it comes to who offers
the amendments. In the House, the party in control tends to
dominate the proceedings. Over the 12 year period that I
examined the Democrats, who were in control, offered 79% of
the amendments offered to the Defense Authorization Bills.
The percentage was the same for the number of amendments that
Democrats offered to the Defense Appropriations Bills form
1981 through 1991. Furthermore, in the House it made a
difference whether or not the Congressman was a member of the
Armed Services Committee or not. House Armed Services
Committee members offered 623 of the 1,021 amendments. I
found it quite interesting that only eleven percent of the
House of Representatives offered 60% of the amendments. This
shows that the Armed Services Committee in the House continues
to be strong. It also demonstrates that the rest of the House
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believes in and respects the decisions of the committee
members
.
The Senate operates a little bit differently. I found
that it did not matter what party was in control when it came
to who offered the amendments. When the Republicans
controlled the Senate from 1981 through 1986, the number of
amendments offered by Republicans and Democrats to the Defense
Authorization Bills were split evenly. The Democrats offered
only five more amendments more that the Republicans over a six
year period. Then when the Democrats controlled the Senate
from 1987 through 1991, this trend basically continued. The
difference between the number of amendments offered by
Democrats and Republicans increased to 27 in favor of the
Democrats. But the increase was a small amount for a five
year period. I also found out that in the Senate that the
distribution of amendments offered to the Defense
Authorization Bill was equal. In fact non-Armed Services
Committee members actually offered more amendments than the
committee members did. This is not to say that the Armed
Services Committee is any less important or respected in the
Senate, but that there is a lot of mutual respect in the
Senate among the Senators and that there is no restriction on
who offers an amendment.
When comparing the House to the Senate on who offers an
amendment, I came to some conclusions. First, in the House
because of its size and to the numerous commitments that they
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have due to the reforms of the 1970 's, the members of the
House rely and depend on the Armed Services Committee and
their amendments as much as they did in the past. While in
the Senate because of their respect for one another's
knowledge on defense matters the non-committee members can and
do offer as many or more amendments than committee members.
This respect can also be seen when you look at and compare the
passage rates of committee and non-committee member offered
amendments. Committee member amendments passed at a rate that
was only six percentage points higher than non-committee
member amendments, where in the House committee member
amendments passed at a rate 14 percentage points higher than
non-committee member amendments did.
Secondly, in the House I feel that there is more
parochialism than in the Senate. The parochialism that I am
speaking of is where the amendments offered by the party in
control pass at a higher rate than the minority party's
amendments. The Democrats offered a lot more amendments than
the Republicans in the House. Moreover, the amendments
offered by the Democrats passed at a rate that was 15
percentage points higher than Republican amendments. This
parochialism can be seen further when looking at the tenure of
Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wi) , when Democrat offered amendments passed
at a rate that was 24 percentage points higher than the
Republican rate. While in the Senate from 1981 through 1991,
Republican amendments offered to the Defense Authorization
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Bills passed at a rate that was five percentage points higher
than amendments offered by Democrats. Nevertheless, this does
not really tell the whole story. During the Republican
controlled years in the Senate there was some parochialism,
while during the years the Democrats were in control the
difference between passage rates was the same as the overall
rate but in favor of the Democrats.
My final and most important conclusion though comes from
looking at how the chairmen voted on different types of
amendments versus the actual passage rates of those amendments
and looking at the percentage of the chair's vote for passage,
rejection and the total of the chair's vote compared to the
number that actually passed, rejected and the total. This
conclusion is that the chairmen of the defense committees
still wield considerable amounts of power.
The main reasons why I feel that the chairmen still have
power are the percentage of the amendments that the chair
votes for that actually pass, the percentage of the amendments
that the chair votes for that actually are rejected and the
total percentage of the chair's vote. In the Senate the chair
voted for 96.53% of the amendments that passed and in the
House the chair voted for 96.97% of the amendments that
passed. This shows that most of the time the chair's support
is needed for an amendment to pass. When it comes to the
chair's vote for rejection, in the Senate 94.82% of the
amendments that chair wanted to be rejected were rejected. In
40
the House the percentage is lower but, 89.69% of the
amendments the chair wanted to be rejected were rejected. The
total of the chair's vote is the final statistic that proves
that the chairmen still have power. 95.53% of the time the
chairman's vote in the Senate was the ultimate fate of the
amendment. The total of the chairman's vote in the House was
just slightly lower at 95.1%.
So my final conclusion is that the chairmen of the House
and Senate Armed Services Committees and to a lesser extent
the chairmen of the Subcommittees on Defense Appropriations
still wield a considerable amount of power in the defense
budgeting process. This is important for several reasons.
First, members in both the House and the Senate should realize
this so if they want to get their amendment passed they need
to have the support of the chairman. More importantly the
Secretary of Defense and the leaders of the four services
should understand that when they want something that is very
important to them regarding the defense budget they, will
primarily have to sell their desires to the chairman and the
ranking minority member of the defense committees. They do
not have to talk to each and every Senator or Congressman.
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APPENDIX- VOTING ON AMENDMENTS OFFERED TO DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATION BILLS IN THE SENATE AND HOUSE
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